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A b s t r a c t :  This article aims to summarize how the organization of knowledge and 
memory in the cerebral cortex, the dynamics of the perception-action cycle and the 
integrative functions of the prefrontal cortex bear on the integration and programming of 
human language.  
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 Late in evolution, one particular brain structure and one particular cognitive 
function undergo enormous development: the first is the prefrontal cortex and the second 
is language.  As this article argues, the two are intimately related.  In the human, the 
prefrontal cortex reaches the size of almost one-third of the entire cortex; especially 
striking is the exponential evolutionary growth of prefrontal fibers and connections, well 
beyond the growth they reach in the large apes.  At the same time, precisely because of 
that extraordinary growth in cortical connectivity, the primitive communication ability of 
the ape becomes language in the human. Thus, the question of the evolutionary continuity 
or discontinuity of either prefrontal function or language becomes moot.  There is indeed 
a quantitative progression from animal to man in the development of the function of the 
prefrontal cortex and in the ability to communicate cognition and emotion; but the 
progression is so large and “sudden”, and exponentially so steep, that for all practical 
purposes both are step functions, qualitatively new and uniquely human. 
That does not mean that the mechanisms of language construction and the role of the 
prefrontal cortex in them are totally new in the human and unprecedented in evolution.  
They are not.  In fact, the spoken (or written) language is a complex and purposeful form 
of behavior, organized and extended in time much as any other complex and aim-directed 
behavior in man or animal.  Therefore, the principles of language construction and the 
role of the prefrontal cortex in it apply to all forms of complex serial behavior.  They do 
not basically differ between the human and other mammalian species.   
 However, we cannot treat language programming quantitatively, as has been done 
with animal behavior.  The reasons are many, but can be summarized as follows: (a) All 
propositional language is essentially new and irreducible to generic algorithms, and so 
are the plans and schemas of behavior in which the prefrontal cortex specializes; (b), new 
language is multi-factorial, the result of many neural and psychological influences, some 
of which are unconscious and imponderable; and (c), the cognitive functions of the 
prefrontal cortex that make language (e.g., planning, attentional set, working memory 
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 It may be argued that normal propositional language is programmable and, like 
machine language, quantifiable. Indeed machine language is quantifiable (i.e., digitized, 
by definition), lineal, and deterministic in its conveyance of meaning.  But machine 
language is not real language—this one with practically infinite recursive capability, 
novelty and spontaneity.  The application of logic to machine language does not make it 
any more human.  Furthermore, in this article I am not dealing with “Neurolinguistic 
Programming,” as advanced by Bandler and Grinder (Dilts et al., 1980) in a theoretical 
approach that was based on quasi-magical reasoning and poor data.  
 In a famous paper entitled “The problem of serial order in behavior,” Harvard 
psychologist Karl Lashley (1951) uses language as an example of the temporally 
integrative syntax of goal-directed action.  He attributes theoretically that role to the 
cerebral cortex, and even proposes that within the cortex there must be an “agent of 
order.”  Today we know that that “agent” is the prefrontal cortex.  But in Lashley’s time, 
we did not know nearly as much as we know now about (1) the organization of knowledge 
and memory in the cerebral cortex, (2) the dynamics of the perception-action cycle, which 
is essential for speech, and (3) the integrative functions of the prefrontal cortex in 
language.  The purpose of this article is to summarize how these three interrelated 
subjects bear on the integration and programming of human language.  
1.  COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION IN THE CEREBRAL CORTEX 
As far as we know (reviews in Fuster, 2009, 2010), all memory and all knowledge are 
stored in an immense organization of widely distributed, overlapping, and interactive 
neuronal networks of the cerebral cortex named cognitive networks or cognits.  A cognit 
is thus a unit of memory or knowledge; it is made of all the cortical neuron assemblies 
that have been simultaneously excited by learning or life experience.  The simultaneous 
excitation of two nerve cells or cell groups that are connected with one another by nerve 
fibers will modulate their synaptic contacts, in such a manner that, afterwards, the 
excitation of one will lead to the activation of the entire network, the entire cognit.  This is 
the essence of memory acquisition and recall.  A new sensory experience can not only tie 
together the cells representing the sensory components of that experience, but also can tie 
together those cells with other cells in old, preexisting cognits with which the new 
experience has relations of association or similarity.  In this manner old cognits expand 
with new experience; in other words, new experience updates, expands, strengthens and 
modifies old memory.  This is in the essence of learning, including the learning of 
language. 
A given cognit, that is, a memory or item of knowledge, is not made of synapses of 
equal strength.  The strongest will be synapses that connect the most salient and repeated 
experiences.  These will form the core of the cognit.  The weakest will be synapses that 
link the cognit with other more distant or softer experiences with which that cognit 
maintains more distant connections, in time and in brain space.  Therefore, the core of a 
cognit is surrounded by a penumbra of weaker associations which may play a critical role 
in the rehabilitation of a memory when its core has been destroyed by trauma, disease or 
aging.   
Cognits, old and new, share network nodes in common.  These are made of cell 
assemblies with heavy associations that represent common features of several cognits (for 
example, the yellow color in the canary, the emblematic rose of Texas or the taxi cab in 
Barcelona).  It follows that a neuron or group of neurons practically anywhere in the 
cortex can be part of many memories or items of knowledge. 
With life experience, learning and rehearsal, cognits self-organize in the cerebral 
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knowledge, which incorporates the new cognits as they are formed, is hierarchical; in 
reality, there are two hierarchies, one in posterior cortex for perceptual cognits acquired 
through the sense organs and the other in anterior, frontal, cortex for executive cognits 
acquired through movement or motor systems (Figure 1).  
  
 
Figure 1. Diagram of the hierarchical organization of memory networks (cognits) in the 
human cortex.  Lower figure:  The posterior cortex is shaded blue to white from primary 
sensory to association areas, the frontal cortex red to white from primary motor to 
prefrontal cortex.  Primary sensory and motor areas are marked in darker blue and red, 
respectively.  Upper figure:  Gradients of development and hierarchical organization of 
cortical cognits, with the same color code as in the map below.  Bidirectional arrows 
symbolize: blue, perceptual cortico-cortical connectivity; red, executive cortico-cortical 
connectivity; green, reciprocal connectivity between posterior and frontal cortices, 
essential for the perception-action cycle (below). As they grow upwards in the hierarchy, 
cognits become more widespread and represent progressively more abstract memory and 
knowledge. 
 
 The simplest, most concrete perceptual cognits are formed and have their roots in the 
lower layers of the perceptual hierarchy, in or near sensory cortices, which I call “phyletic” 
memory or memory of the species.  I call these structures “memory” because they contain 
the evolutionary and genetic adaptive memory of the species in dealing with the sensory 
world in which we live. All individual memory enters the organism through phyletic 
memory before it finds its appropriate level in the hierarchy.  Likewise, in frontal cortex, 
there is a hierarchy of executive networks with a base and root in phyletic motor memory, 
the motor cortex.  At the top of both hierarchies, in posterior association cortex and in 
prefrontal cortex, are the cognits representing the most conceptual and abstract aspects of 
perceptual and executive memory/knowledge, respectively. 
 It is important to note that many, perhaps most, cognits are heterarchical, in that they 
contain information from various hierarchical levels of abstraction.  It is also important to 
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“horizontally,” which explains the existence of mixed, perceptual-executive cognits.  As we 
will see, these are functionally critical in the perception-action cycle and in speech.  In 
fact, for the structuring of language, the entire cortical organization of cognition is critical, 
because it contains the information that all language utilizes.  The concepts of “language 
areas” and “language modules” are outmoded.  It is impossible to separate language 
content from speech function.  The cortical infrastructure is the same for both.  That 
means that neuroprogramming is inseparable from the neural structure of knowledge.      
  Finally, all cognits have lexical connections.  Among the many associations (synaptic 
contacts) that form them are the associations with phonetic sounds and graphic symbols; 
those lexical associations are parallel to the cognitive hierarchies. Their collateral 
organizations for associated words are also to some extent heterarchical, because at their 
lower levels they incorporate word sounds and at the highest levels the words for abstract 
concepts.  The two lexical organizations, perceptual and executive, as a whole, constitute 
the brain’s semantic system, which, like the cognitive hierarchies, is distributed 
throughout the cerebral cortex.   
2.  CORTICAL DYNAMICS OF THE PERCEPTION-ACTION CYCLE 
 Animals adapt themselves to their environment by means of sensory and chemical 
receptors, motor systems and the autonomic nervous system—for visceral control and 
emotions.  Lower animal species do their adjustment to the environment by reflex arcs 
through simple receptors and motor effectors.  Those reflexes may be conditioned, that is, 
modified by behavioral learning.  In any case, adaptive reactions, whether innate or 
conditioned, are immediate and automatic, without much regard for their implications in 
terms of the past or the future.     
 In higher animal species, the adjustment is much more elaborate and extends 
considerably in time, backwards and forwards.  Changes that have occurred in the past 
modulate and influence new actions, while these acquire a temporal perspective into the 
future.  In the pursuit of a goal, sensory systems inform motor systems, which will 
implement the appropriate actions toward that goal.  These actions will produce changes 
in the environment, which in turn will be analyzed by sensory systems, which will modify 
the actions, and so on until the goal is reached.  This cybernetic circling of influences back 
and forth through the environment and the nervous system is what we call the 
perception-action (PA) cycle. 
 Also in higher animals, the PA cycle is supplemented by an important new set of 
connections: internal fibers, inside the brain, from effector (motor) systems to sensory 
systems (Uexküll, 1926).  These “backward” internal connections, close an internal cycle 
that parallels the external PA cycle and provide the latter with a future dimension.  Thus, 
thanks to that internal cycle, the PA cycle becomes future-oriented and, therefore, not 
only adaptive but also preadaptive.  It predicts future events and adjusts to them before 
they happen.  That capacity to predict is largely based on past memory and knowledge 
(Fuster and Bressler, 2015). Here is in summary what that backward internal cycle does: 
(a) it prepares sensory systems (attentional perceptual set) for the expected consequences 
of ongoing action, (b) it prepares motor systems (attentional executive set) for impending 
action, (d) it helps store in working memory the information which is going to guide that 
action to its goal, and (e), because of those prospective functions (a-d), the internal cycle 
plays a critical role in decision-making.  These cognitive functions assist the prefrontal 
cortex to mediate cross- temporal contingencies and to establish order in a given goal-
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Figure 2.  Succession of acts (a1 . . . an) in a plan toward its goal.  Two-way arrows 
represent cross-temporal contingencies.  Some of them link individual acts to each other, 
while others link individual acts to the plan or the goal of the action, and still others link 
the plan to the goal.  In the upper figure is a chain of habitual or instinctual acts, where 
each act is strictly contingent on the immediately previous one and the succeeding one 
without cross-temporal contingencies between them.  The prefrontal cortex is needed for 
integration of the lower sequence, not the upper one.  If we substitute words for acts, we 
have the structure of a piece of spoken language, where the cross-temporal contingencies 
are grammatical and syntactic. 
 
Now we can illustrate, however schematically, the PA cycle running through the 
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Figure 3.  Upper figure:  Schematic diagram of the PA cycle (thick blue arrows through 
perceptual hierarchy, and red arrows through action hierarchy).  The internal cycle is 
indicated by a vertical pink arrow.  That intra-cerebral circuit (indicated by red arrow in 
Uexküll’s schema below left, and also by red arrow below right, from prefrontal cortex to 
superior associative cortex) is essential for future-oriented cognitive control functions 
(section 3).  Lower right: General cortical circuitry of the PA cycle.  Unlabeled rectangles 
represent cortical areas intermediate between labeled areas or sub-areas of the latter.  The 
perceptual cognitive hierarchies are depicted on the left, the executive hierarchy on the 
right. The major connectivity of the cycle runs through thick arrows.  Thin arrows mark 
intra-cortical feedback connections. 
 
 The figure shows the cerebral pathways that mediate the performance of a series of 
consecutive actions toward a goal.  Each turn of the cycle involves the feed-forward action 
of the cycle toward the goal, the sensory feedback from the effects of the action on the 
environment, the matching in the cortex of those effects with regard to the plan and the 
goal, and the correct preparation of the next action.  All actions require the cognitive 
control of the prefrontal cortex for the mediation of cross-temporal contingencies and for 
the future-oriented functions of attention set, working memory, decision-making, and 
inhibitory control of interference. 
 The purpose of the previous section (1) and of this one (2) has been to outline the 
principles of the cortical organization of memory and knowledge, including semantic and 
lexical knowledge, which is to play an essential role in the structuring of the spoken 
language.  The important point of both sections is to set the neural stage for the dynamic 
principle that the syntax of speech is a special case of the syntax of goal-directed action 
(words in language).  This is most evident when applying the PA cycle to the spoken or 
written language.  Each semantic expression, whether it is a word, a sentence or a piece of 
discourse, is a turn of the cycle. It is an action informed by knowledge (semantics and 
lexicon in posterior cortex) that the subject executes upon the environment (the listener 
or the written page).  That action produces certain effects on the environment that the 
subject, via sensory feedback, analyzes in association cortex to inform the next semantic 
expression; that next expression is informed not only by the sensory effects of the 
previous one but also by internal feedback (internal PA cycle).  This internal feedback 
contains “efferent copies” of the output (listening internally to oneself) and predictive 
signals from the prefrontal cortex (next section). 
 The spoken dialog between two persons is a vivid example of two PA cycles interlocked 
with each other; the environment in this case is the interlocutor.  The goal is mutual 
understanding or the convincing of the interlocutor.  Each speaker will mobilize his/her 
own PA cycle, which will guide the dialog to that goal assisted by memory, knowledge and 
reasoning as well as by the effects of one speaker’s pronouncements on the thinking and 
speech of the other speaker.       
3.  THE PREFRONTAL CORTEX IN LANGUAGE  
 The prefrontal cortex contributes to language two fundamental qualities: the syntax 
and the future tense.   Both derive from the role of this cortex in the PA cycle and in its 
control of prospective, that is predictive, cognitive functions. 
 In the same manner as with coordinated goal-directed actions, the prefrontal and 
posterior association cortices, at the top of the PA cycle, coordinate the execution, the 
programming, of the spoken language. By mediating cross-temporal contingencies, that 
is, by integrating words across time, the prefrontal cortex, which is the highest stage of 
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meaningful expression.  The prefrontal cortex has the unique ability to propositionise 
(Jackson, 1958); that is the ability to construct new meaningful statements.  Interestingly, 
the vocable “propositionise,” originated by the neurologist Jackson, implies two 
properties of language that intimately relate it to prefrontal function: one is novelty and 
the other, more subtle, is the intention of future influence on the environment—the 
interlocutor, the reader or the audience.  Let us briefly consider the two properties, 
novelty and future, which, in addition to the previous two sections, place language fully 
within the purview of the prefrontal cortex. 
 In 1970, Noam Chomsky, in a public lecture (Peck, 1987), declared the following:  
“Language is a process of free creation; its laws and principles are fixed, but the manner 
in which the principles of generation are used is free and infinitely varied. Even the 
interpretation and use of words involves a process of free creation.” The key to novelty 
in language is that, with a limited set of rules, one can construct a practically infinite 
variety of expressions, given that the semantic material to which those rules are applied is 
practically infinite.  Because the language code (the lexicon) is a relational code, based on 
relations (associations) between words, and because words are represented in neuronal 
assemblies in widely differing cortical locations, the creative power of speech resides in 
the combinatorial power of those assemblies and the material they represent, which is 
practically infinite. 
  What is finite, as Chomsky maintains, is the set of rules that make the spoken language 
an orderly goal-directed activity. These rules are generally well defined; in the case of 
language, they are called grammar.  (This is not the place to discuss Chomsky’s concept of 
“universal grammar”).   Like all forms of goal-directed activity and the material they work 
with (cognits), the grammar of language is hierarchically organized, as are also the 
performance of manual tasks and music making.  The hierarchical organization of a goal-
directed activity such as those depends essentially of (1) a neurally defined schema of the 
action, a high-level cognit of the plan or program and its objective, most probably in 
anterior prefrontal cortex, and (2) a series of temporally ordered sub-routines controlled 
by that “umbrella” cognit and leading to the goal.  The control of the sequence consists 
basically of the mediation of cross-temporal contingencies by the prefrontal cortex 
engaged in the PA cycle. 
 Modern neuroimaging of human subjects during the execution of behavioral tasks, 
spoken language and music making, provide increasing evidence of the hierarchical 
dynamics of these activities in the prefrontal cortex.  A recent review of the relevant 
studies has recently been published (Jeon, 2014).  Figure 4 nearby, from that review, 
represents the structure of the executive hierarchies of both speech and music.  The figure 
shows not only the commonality of the hierarchical principles of that structure for the two 
activities, with its nesting of subroutines and recursion, but also the theoretical and 
empirical neural basis for the serial mediation of cross-temporal contingencies from plan 
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Figure 4.  Similarities in hierarchical structure between language and music. (A)  An 
English sentence. The syntactic tree depicts the hierarchical relations among words and 
phrases. Abbreviations: S, sentence; NP, nounphrase;  VP, verbphrase; S’, sentence 
modifier [relative clause]; N, noun; V, verb; Det, determiner; Rel-Pro, relative pronoun.  
(B)  A phrase from a composition by Johann Sebastian Bach.  The phrase is overlaid by a 
syntactic  tree depicting the hierarchical pattern of tension and relaxation embedded in 
larger scale motions. (From Patel, 2003, slightly modified by Jeon, 2014, with 
permission). 
  
 The second fundamental property of prefrontal dynamics, which is eminently 
applicable to language, is its future quality.  That, too, comes from elementary biology.  
The prefrontal cortex is the part of the organism that preadapts the nervous system to the 
environment; as such, it predicts future events—including the organism’s own actions—
and adapts the organism to them before they take place (Fuster, 2014 Fuster and Bressler, 
2014). The essence of our argument is that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex supports 
four cognitive-control functions that are future-oriented and play a critical role in the PA 
cycle and in the mediation of cross-temporal contingencies.  All four are critical to the 
spoken language and rely on interactions between that cortex and other cortices 
(containing memory and knowledge of the past), as well as with sub-cortical structures:   
 (1)  Planning, to self-predict trains of goal directed actions.  
 (2)  Attentional set, to prime selectively sensory and motor system for anticipated 
inputs or actions.  
 (3)  Working memory, to retain an item of information for an anticipated action.  
 (4)  Decision-making, to choose one among several alternative actions. 
 These functions, the essence of so-called cognitive control, constitute what makes the 
prefrontal cortex a preadaptive brain structure.  Inasmuch as preadaptation implies 
prediction (from Latin, praedicere, to foretell), it is essential to all language that refers to 
future action.  More generally, the prefrontal cortex can be construed as the maker of the 
future of the organism and the foundation of its creative power.   
 The four aforementioned functions are predictive of a more or less distant future.  In 
the human brain, that future extends much more distantly than in lower animals.  For this 
reason, the human PA cycle can extend to years and decades, containing countless shorter 
cycles, each with its programmed subroutine. But the predictive power of those functions 
is solidly based on the past and updatable (Fuster and Bressler, 2014 in press).  In that 
sense future action and language are subject to Bayesian probability (Jaynes, 1986).  
Their effects on the environment (e.g., the interlocutor) are based on past hypotheses that 
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 In former times, the spoken language was relegated to two discrete areas of the 
cerebral cortex of the left cerebral hemisphere:  one posterior, in the temporal-parietal 
region, dedicated to the understanding of the meaning of language (Wernicke’s area), and 
the other anterior, in the in ferior prefrontal cortex, dedicated to the articulation of 
language (Broca’s area).  Today we know that the two areas in question represent only two 
relatively small portions of the cognitive cortex and the PA cycle, although dramatic 
speech disorders (aphasias) can result from their lesion.   
 The latest evidence from neuropsychology and neuroimaging, however, implicates in 
speech practically the totality of the neocortex (the last cortex to develop phylogenetically 
in evolution, and ontogenetically in the individual), including the cortex of the right 
hemisphere.  To the best of our knowledge (Section 1), that evidence is attributable to the 
widespread distribution of cognitive networks (cognits), those countless networks that are 
involved or can be involved in language.  As a consequence, a large variety of speech 
disorders can result from disease or trauma of the cerebral cortex in numerous locations. 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
To sum up, large portions of the cerebral cortex participate in the neural structure and 
dynamic programming of the spoken language.  The syntax of language is a special case of 
the syntax of action.  Essentially, the anatomical structure of language consists of a large 
mass of widely distributed, overlapping and interconnected networks of cortical neurons 
that represent the memory and the knowledge acquired by life experience.  These 
networks or cognits contain lexical content and associations.  Perceptual cognits, with 
information acquired through the senses, are hierarchically organized mainly in posterior 
(temporal and parietal) cortex, whereas executive cognits, with information acquired 
through action, are hierarchically organized mainly in frontal cortex.  In any planned and 
goal-directed sequence of actions, such as speech, practically the entire cortex engages in 
the PA cycle, which is the cybernetic interface between the organism and its environment.  
The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, at the hierarchical summit of the PA cycle, controls its 
progress toward the goal by four cognitive functions that mediate cross-temporal 
contingencies, that is, integrate those contingencies in the time domain: planning, 
attentional set, working memory, and decision-making.  All four of these functions are 
cognitively anchored in the past but have a future orientation.  By circular interactions 
between prefrontal cortex and posterior cortex, they establish syntactic order in the 
language sequence and guide it to its objective.  
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